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Abstract. We investigate what can be learned about the prevalence of work
disability using self-reported assessments of work capacity. Although health status
is widely recognized as a crucial determinant of labor supply behavior and participa-
tion in public transfer programs, there is a long-standing debate about the reliability
of self-reported indicators. Anderson and Burkhauser (1985), in fact, labeled the
appropriate use of health controls “the major unsettled issue in the empirical litera-
ture on the labor supply of older workers,” and the debate has only grown stronger
over time. Rather than focus on assumptions required to obtain point identi…cation,
we take a step back to evaluate what can be inferred about disability rates under
a variety of assumptions that are weaker but arguably more credible than those
imposed in the existing literature.
Extending the work on corrupt samples developed by Horowitz and Manski
(1995), we develop a set of nonparametric bounds that, in the most basic setting,
require only prior information restricting the fraction of persons who might misre-
port disability. These bounds inform the ongoing debate by e¤ectively constraining
the range of uncertainty regarding the e¤ects of inaccurate reporting on inferences.
The results clearly show that the strength of the conclusions one can draw depend
directly on the strength of the assumptions one is willing to impose. Under minimal
assumptions, the bounds are nearly uninformative. Tighter bounds can be obtained
with additional assumptions. Under the assumption that the true disability rate is
nondecreasing with age, our results imply that conventional participation models
which presume valid self-reports may be misspeci…ed.
1. INTRODUCTION
¤We have bene…ted from the comments of Kelly DeRango and seminar participants at the Uni-
versity of Virginia, the 2001 ASSA meetings, and the 2001 Summer Econometrics Society Meetings.
1Health status is widely recognized as a crucial determinant of labor supply be-
havior and participation in public transfer programs. In recent years, however, it has
become increasingly apparent that inferences about the e¤ects of disability status
on participation outcomes are sensitive to the way health is measured. Importantly
for policy analysis, inferences about the impacts of economic variables correlated
with health can also be quite sensitive to the choice of health controls. For example,
Anderson and Burkhauser’s (1984) estimated wage elasticity of work participation
varied …ve-fold depending on the type of measure used to control for work ability;
they labeled the appropriate use of health controls “the major unsettled issue in
the empirical literature on the labor supply of older workers,” and the debate has
only grown stronger over time. Ongoing debates regarding the in‡uence of Social
Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) policy on falling labor force participation rates
have also focused in part on the reliability of self-reported disability information
[e.g., Haveman and Wolfe (1984) vs. Parsons (1984); Bound (1991b) vs. Parsons
(1991)].1
This paper considers the problem of drawing inferences on the prevalence of work
disability using self-reports of work capacity. Many labor force participation studies
control for disability status based on subjective self-reports of limitation, such as
responses to questions of the form: “Do you have a health impairment that limits
the kind or amount of work you can perform?” We examine the prevalence rate of
“true disability” among respondents in the Health and Retirement Study (HRS), a
survey of persons nearing retirement that is commonly used to evaluate the e¤ects
of disability on the behavior of older persons.
After describing these data in the next section, Section 3 formalizes the identi…-
cation problem created by misreporting. To draw inferences about disability status,
researchers invariably impose strong assumptions restricting the nature of misre-
porting. Most studies treat subjective self-reports of work limitation as accurate
relative to thresholds speci…ed by social norms or by disability program administra-
tors. Benitez-Silva, Chan, Rust, and Sheidvasseret (1997), for example, explicitly
assume that all self-reports of work incapacity are accurate relative to the Social
Security Administration’s (SSA) de…nition of disability and use these self-reports to
calculate Type I and Type II errors in the SSA’s adjudication process.
In contrast, many researchers are skeptical of the accuracy of self-reports. Bound
and Burkhauser (1999), for example, suggest the possibility that “those who apply
for SSDI and especially those who are awarded bene…ts tend to exaggerate the
extent of their work limitations (relative to those who do not apply)...” Eligibility
for disability transfers is speci…cally tied to diminished work capacity. Others (e.g.,
Bowe, 1993) have argued that the threshold for claiming disability may be lower
for those who …nd themselves out of the labor force, either by choice or through
involuntarily unemployment. Some people out of the labor force prior to the normal
1See Kreider (1999) for a review of this literature. Bound (1991a) provides an
illuminating analysis of the econometric issues surrounding the debate.
2retirement age may rationalize their nonwork status as driven mostly by their health
conditions instead of by other factors such as high preferences for leisure or unlucky
labor market outcomes.
Studies that have modeled and assessed the reliability of self-reported work lim-
itations have not been able to resolve these issues. Stern (1989) and Dwyer and
Mitchell (1998), for example, accept the hypothesis that labor market outcomes
do not a¤ect reporting behavior. In contrast, Kerkhofs and Lindeboom (1995),
O’Donnell (1998) and Kreider (1999, 2000) reject this hypothesis. Using di¤erent
approaches, these studies estimate large reporting errors that are systematically re-
lated to labor force status. All of these studies, however, impose strong parametric
assumptions on the reporting error process.
Given the unresolved controversy about the validity of self-reported health mea-
sures, the current study does not focus on providing point estimates of the true
disability rate; instead, we take a step back to evaluate what can be inferred about
the disability rate under a variety of nonparametric assumptions that are weaker but
arguably more credible than those imposed in the existing literature. Using methods
developed by Horowitz and Manski (1995), Section 4 considers what can be learned
if one is willing to assume only an upper bound on the fraction of inaccurate dis-
ability reports. Sections 5 and 6 extend the nonparametric bounds literature. First,
we evaluate what can be inferred when certain observed subgroups are assumed to
provide valid self-reports. We also allow for the possibility that some fraction of
respondents in a veri…ed subgroup may provide inaccurate reports, a generalization
especially useful for sensitivity analysis. In our application, we …nd that the disabil-
ity bounds can be narrowed substantially. We next consider the identifying power
of linking true disability status and the probability of employment. In Section 7, we
consider a monotone instrumental variable assumption (Manski and Pepper, 2000)
that the true disability rate rises weakly with age. Combining this assumption with
other restrictions, we can nearly achieve point identi…cation. Importantly, the 90%
con…dence intervals for the true disability rate often do not include the self-reported
disability rate.
The nonparametric models formalized and evaluated in Sections 4–7 allow re-
searchers to layer successively stronger assumptions on misreporting behavior. In
each section, we estimate models under speci…c assumptions that appear to have
broad consensus and evaluate the sensitivity of the estimated bounds to those as-
sumptions. Section 8 concludes.
2. DATA
Our analysis uses data from the longitudinal Health and Retirement Study, a
nationally representative survey of 7608 households whose heads were nearing re-
tirement age (aged 51-61) at the time of the initial interview in 1992-93. To date,
subsequent phone interviews have been administered every two years. The HRS has
become an especially popular data source for studying the e¤ects of health status
3and public policy on work behavior of older persons because of its detailed informa-
tion about health and disability, work history, and participation in public transfer
programs. The …rst wave is comprised of 12,652 respondents (heads and other adult
h o u s e h o l dm e m b e r s ) ,a l lo fw h i c ha r eu s e di nt h i ss t u d y . 2 Some of our analysis
also exploits information from the second wave. For each respondent, we observe
self-reported disability indicators, labor force participation status, and whether the
respondent received government assistance for a disability. We also use information
about the respondent’s age.
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics for our sample. Beginning with Frame
A, 21.5% of the respondents responded in the a¢rmative to the question, “Do you
have any impairment or health problem that limits the kind or amount of paid
work you can do?” Respondents were also asked about current job status: “Are
you working now, temporarily laid o¤, unemployed and looking for work, disabled
and unable to work, retired, a homemaker, or what?” About 9% indicated that
they were disabled and unable to work. Of those who reported that impairments
limit the kind or amount of work (above), 42% reported that they were unable to
work altogether. Conversely, about 96% of those who reported being unable to work
a l t o g e t h e rc l a i m e dt ob el i m i t e di nt h ek i n do ra m o u n to fw o r kt h e yc o u l dp e r f o r m
(suggesting some misunderstanding or coding errors among the remaining 4%). We
classify respondents as work-limited by their own self-assessments (denoted X =1
below) if they answered yes to either of the disability questions. Using this standard,
21.8% of the respondents in the sample claimed to be disabled.
In addition to self-reported disability measures, we also observe whether the
respondent was employed and/or receiving disability bene…ts. In total, 66.2% of
respondents identi…ed themselves as currently working for pay, while 10.0% reported
that they were receiving disability bene…ts (or were scheduled to begin receiving
bene…ts) from Social Security Disability Insurance, Supplemental Security Income,
Veterans’ Disability, Workers’ Compensation, or a state disability program.3
Frame B shows that there are large variations in the reported disability rates
across personal characteristics. Nonworkers, for example, are over four times as
likely to report a disability as workers. Predictably, reported disability is positively
associated with age and bene…ciary status. As seen in the top frame, however, there
is little di¤erence in the self-reports of men and women: 23.0% of the men and
20.8% of the women responded that they were limited in their ability to work.
3. THE IDENTIFICATION PROBLEM
To evaluate the impact of invalid response on the ability to infer disability, we
introduce notation which distinguishes between self-reports and the truth. Let X be
2For the variables used in this study, there is only one missing value (for age),
which we imputed. The attrition rate is 8% between the …rst and second waves.
3We did not classify the respondent as receiving disability assistance in some
cases in which the head of household reported disability income but we could not
determine which family member was receiving the bene…t.
4the self-reported measure, where X =1if the respondent reports a limitation and 0
otherwise.4 Let W =1indicate that the individual is truly disabled relative to social
norms, with W =0otherwise. Finally, let Z indicate whether a respondent provides
accurate information, with Z =1if W = X and Z =0otherwise. We are interested
in making inferences about the unobserved true disability rate, P(W =1 ) .5
Some fraction, P(X =1 ;Z =0 ) , inaccurately report being disabled (false pos-
itives) relative to accepted standards while others, P(X =0 ;Z =0 ) , inaccurately
report being able-bodied (false negatives). Thus, the true and reported disability
rates are related as follows:
P(W =1 )=P(X =1 )+P(X =0 ;Z=0 )¡ P(X =1 ;Z=0 ) : (1)
The observed disability rate equals the true disability rate if the fraction of
false negative reports exactly o¤sets the fraction of false positive reports. The
data, however, only identify the fraction of the population who self-report disability,
P(X =1 ) . The sampling process cannot identify the fraction who falsely claim
disability or who falsely claim to be able-bodied.
4. LOWER BOUNDS ON ACCURATE REPORTS
We now evaluate what can be inferred about the disability rate P(W =1 )given
prior information on the fraction of respondents who provide valid self-reports. In
particular, suppose
P(Z =1 )¸ v (2)
where v is a known lower bound on the accurate reporting rate. By varying the value
of v, we can e¤ectively consider the wide range of views characterizing the debate
on inaccurate reporting. Those believing that all reports are accurate set v =1 ,i n
which case the sampling process identi…es the disability rate (e.g., Benitez-Silva et
al., 1997). Those believing that all reports are potentially inaccurate (e.g., Myers,
4Except for the material in Section 6, we do not condition on observed covariates.
In practice, we …nd that conditioning on these variables makes almost no di¤erence
for the qualitative conclusions.
5One common assumption applied in analyses of misreporting is that invalid re-
porting errors are independent of the outcome of interest. That is, P(W =1 )=
P(X =1 jZ =1 ) : Under this independence assumption, termed the contaminated
sampling model by Horowitz and Manski (1995), the true population disability rate
equals the reported rate among those accurately revealing their disability status.
Whether this model applies has implicitly been a matter of considerable disagree-
ment in the labor supply literature. Benitez-Silva et al. (1997), for example, argue
that misreporting is exogenous to the extent that it exists it all. Of course, others
have argued that misreporting may in fact be related to whether a person is disabled.
We present results for only the more general corrupt sampling model which allows
for arbitrary misreporting. Corresponding results for the contaminated sampling
case are available upon request for all the propositions and proofs in this paper.
51982; Bowe, 1993) set v =0 , in which case the sampling process is uninformative.
Middle ground positions can be evaluated by setting v somewhere between 0 and 1.
In fact, the existing literature provides a number of plausible restrictions. Con-
cerns over misreporting are generally based on two distinct observations, one …-
nancial and one social. First, eligibility for some government assistance programs
(e.g., SSDI) is tied to both earnings and disability status. Program applicants have
…nancial incentives to exaggerate work limitations (Bound and Burkhauser, 1999).
Second, many people (especially men) may believe that they are expected to work
until normal retirement age unless their ability to work is impaired (Bound, 1991a).
Although some respondents clearly have incentives to misreport limitation, those
in a number of observed subgroups have few economic or psychological incentives to
misreport.6 Employed respondents, for example, are generally ineligible for govern-
ment assistance and face neither strong social nor …nancial pressures to misreport.7
Likewise, there appear to be few incentives to falsely claim to be able-bodied. Some
might …nd it reasonable to assume that recent Disability Insurance bene…ciaries –
who faced stringent disability screening and are o¢cially deemed incapable of sub-
stantial work – can be considered a veri…ed work-limited subgroup. Still others
might exploit information from repeated interviews (e.g., in the HRS) to identify
veri…ed subgroups. For example, if a respondent reports being able-bodied in one
wave despite being unemployed, then one might be willing to label that respondent
as an accurate reporter in other waves even if a disability is claimed.
The fraction of the caseload without apparent incentives to exaggerate limita-
tions might be used to provide an upper bound v. In our data, 10% of the respon-
dents are disability bene…ciaries, 27% claimed no disability in the second wave of the
survey despite being out of the labor force, 66% of the respondents were gainfully
employed, 78% claimed no work limitation in wave 1, and 92% of the respondents
satis…ed at least one of these criteria. In this section, we evaluate what can be
learned about the true disability rate if all that is known is that at least some per-
centage of the caseload provides valid reports. We do not assume that respondents
from any particular subgroup provide valid reports – only that a lower bound on
the aggregate fraction of accurate reporters is available.
4.1 Nonparametric Bounds
6Certainly, arguments could be made that some respondents in any of these groups
might misreport work limitation. Social or economic pressures may in‡uence some
workers, for instance, to downplay a disability. Further, some respondents may
not know how to accurately answer questions about health status so that there is
measurement error in the reported indicators. These methods, however, apply to
any model of misreporting (including measurement error) so long as one has some
prior information restricting the invalid response rate.
7Kreider (1999), for example, explicitly assumes that all workers provide valid
reports. Stern (1989) also explicitly assumes that misreporting is related to work
outcomes.
6Suppose that no more than some known fraction, 1 ¡ v, of the population mis-
reports disability status. In the absence of additional information, it might be that
1 ¡ v percent of the population incorrectly reports being disabled. At the other
extreme, it might be that this fraction incorrectly reports being able-bodied. Thus,
from (1) we know that
maxfP(X =1 )¡ (1 ¡ v);0g·P(W =1 )· minfP(X =1 )+( 1¡ v);1g: (3)
These bounds are derived by Horowitz and Manski (1995, Proposition, Corollary
1.2). Henceforth, we will refer to these as the HM bounds. Intuitively, the bounds
narrow as the upper bound misreporting rate 1 ¡ v declines. In our application,
the HM bounds remain completely uninformative unless it can be assumed that the
accurate reporting rate exceeds 0.218; the lower bound is zero unless it is known
that at least 78.2% of responses are accurate.
Table 2 presents the estimated HM bounds and 90% bootstrap con…dence inter-
vals under various assumptions about the proportion of accurate reports.8 If only
10% of respondents are known to provide accurate reports of work limitation, the
HM bounds are uninformative. In contrast, if it is known that at least 66% of re-
spondents provide accurate reports, then the true disability rate is estimated to lie
within [0, 0.556]. Under the weak upper bound assumptions explored in this section,
the self-reported disability measures provide only modest information on the true
disability rate unless the veri…cation probability v is large.
5. VERIFICATION OF OBSERVED SUBGROUPS
Arguably, certain observed subgroups provide valid reports. As suggested above,
workers, the able-bodied, disability bene…ciaries, and others have few economic or
psychological incentives to misreport. In this section, we evaluate what can be
learned about the true disability rate when an observed subgroup (e.g., workers)
is known to provide valid reports.9 This veri…cation assumption narrows the HM
bounds by e¤ectively shrinking the pool of false positive reports and the pool of
false negative reports.10
Formally, let Y indicate whether a respondent’s self-report of disability is veri…ed
to be accurate, where Y =1if the report is veri…ed and Y =0otherwise. Using the
law of total probability, we can decompose the true disability rate by subgroups:
P(W =1 )=P(W =1 jY =1 ) P(Y =1 )+P(W =1 jY =0 ) P(Y =0 ) : (4)
8The 90% con…dence interval re‡ects the 0.05 quantile of the bootstrapped dis-
tribution (from 500 pseudo samples) of the lower bound and the 0.95 quantile of the
bootstrapped distribution of the upper bound.
9In other contexts, this assumption has been evaluated under the case of contam-
inated sampling (see footnote 5) by Lambert and Tierney (1997) and Dominitz and
Sherman (1998).
10We assume that the lower bound accurate reporting rate v equals the fraction
of cases in veri…ed groups. This assumption can be relaxed by allowing the lower
bound probability on accurate reporting to exceed the veri…cation probability.
7Under the veri…cation assumption, the data reveal the fraction of veri…ed cases,
P(Y =1 ) ; and the disability rate among the veri…ed cases, P(W =1 jY =1 )=
P(X =1 jY =1 ) . We have no prior information about the validity of self-reports
from the unveri…ed cases, so it might be that all unveri…ed cases are disabled or
able-bodied.11 Thus, we have:
Proposition 1: Given P(Y =1 )=v and P(Z =1 jY =1 )=1 ,
P(X =1 ;Y =1 )· P(W =1 )· P(X =1 ;Y =1 )+P(Y =0 ) :
Intuitively, in this informational setting the true disability rate can be no less
than the reported rate among veri…ed cases and no greater than this rate plus
the fraction of unveri…ed cases. Thus, the width of this bound is the fraction of
unveri…ed cases, P(Y =0 ) . If, for example, all workers provide accurate reports
about limitation, then the true disability rate must be at least as high as the fraction
of workers claiming limitation but no larger than this fraction plus the fraction of
nonworkers.
Notice that validating certain observed subgroups provides additional informa-
tion beyond just an upper bound on the degree of corruption. In particular, the
validation bound in Proposition 1 is narrower than the HM bound derived using
only the upper bound misreporting rate. Without validation, it might be that 1¡v
percent of respondents falsely claim to be disabled (or able-bodied). With valida-
tion, the upper bound fraction of persons falsely claiming to be disabled equals the
fraction of unveri…ed cases who report being disabled, P(X =1 ;Y =0 ) ,w h i c hi sa
subset of the fraction of all unveri…ed cases P(Y =0 )=1¡v. Similarly, the upper
bound fraction of false negatives under veri…cation is bounded by P(X =0 ;Y =0 ) ;
a subset of the unveri…ed cases. At least one of the bounds will be tighter.
5.1 Results
The width of the veri…cation bound depends on the lower bound accurate re-
porting rate v = P(Y =1 )and the reported disability rate P(X =1 )as well as the
fraction of veri…ed respondents reporting disabilities, P(X =1 jY =1 ) : In contrast
to the HM bounds, the bounds under partial veri…cation are always informative for
v>0. Veri…cation has the greatest impact on the bounds for middle-range values
of v; as the lower bound accurate reporting rate v approaches one, the HM bounds
converge to the self-reported disability rate P(X =1 ) .
The right-hand side of Table 2 displays the estimated disability rate bounds un-
der veri…cation. If workers alone are validated, for example, then the true disability
rate is estimated to lie within [0:064;0:402]. If all the groups previously discussed are
veri…ed, then the true disability rate is estimated to lie within the six point range of
[0:156;0:218].12 The veri…cation bounds can be substantially more informative than
11Note that this model is precisely the case of censored outcomes considered by
Manski (1995).
12A particularly simple result for the upper bound arises if those reporting to be
able-bodied are considered veri…ed. In this case, the possibility of misreporting is
8the HM bounds evaluated in the previous section. When only workers are veri…ed,
for example, the width of the 90% con…dence interval on the disability rate reduces
from 57 points to 35 points.
5.2 Partial Veri…cation of Subgroups
Thus far, we have assumed that all respondents in a veri…ed subgroup provide
valid reports. An important middle ground informational setting arises if there is
only partial information about an observed subgroup. As in the HM framework,
there may be subgroups for which one only knows an upper bound on the degree of
inaccurate reporting. Suppose, for example, that diagnostic tests used to evaluate
health status and determine eligibility for assistance programs are only e¤ective up
to some known error rate (see, e.g., Parsons, 1996). Then, SSDI recipients would be
partially veri…ed. Likewise, those with few social or …nancial incentives to misreport
(e.g., workers) may nevertheless be unable to accurately assess the degree to which
they are disabled. For certain observed groups, researchers may be willing to at
least assume a lower bound on the accurate reporting rate.
Formally, assume that at least some fraction vy of the self-reports are known to
be accurate such that P(Z =1 jY =1 )¸ vy. In this case, the disability rate for
the partially veri…ed subgroup is not identi…ed. Instead, applying the HM bounds
in (3), we …nd
maxfP(X =1 jY =1 )¡ (1 ¡ vy);0g·P(W =1 jY =1 ) (5)
· minfP(X =1 jY =1 )+( 1¡ vy);1g:
The data are uninformative about the unveri…ed subgroup, Y =0 . Combining (4)
and (5) reveals:
Proposition 2: Under the partial veri…cation assumption P(Z =1 jY =1 )¸ vy,
maxfP(X =1 ;Y =1 )¡ (1 ¡ vy)P(Y =1 ) ;0g·P(W =1 )
· minfP(X =1 ;Y =1 )+( 1¡ vy)P(Y =1 )+P(Y =0 ) ;1g:
Intuitively, the bounds widen if respondents in veri…ed subgroups may misreport.
Still, for a su¢ciently large lower bound accurate reporting rate vy, partial veri…ca-
tion improves on the HM bounds in (3).13 Consider, for example, the HM bound
limited to those reporting disability, so the upper bound is simply the reported
disability rate, P(X =1 ) .




v for v>P(X =0 )
P(X =0 jY =1 )for v · P(X =0 ) ;




v for v ¸ P(X =0 )
P(X =1 jY =1 )for v<P(X =0 ) :
9where v =0 :662; the fraction of workers. If we assume partial veri…cation on work-
ers, then the upper bound in Proposition 2 represents an improvement over the
HM bound if it is known that at least 76% of workers provide valid responses; the
lower bound is improved if it is known that at least 90% of workers provide valid
responses.
6. MONOTONICITY AND VERIFICATION
In addition to assuming that certain subgroups are veri…ed (or partially veri…ed),
one might also be willing to impose restrictions on the relationship between disability
and other observed characteristics. A seemingly innocuous assumption, for example,
is that disability status is monotonically related to employment status. Disabilities,
by de…nition, limit one’s capacity to work, ceteris paribus. Let L =1indicate that
a respondent participated in the labor force, with L =0otherwise. Formally, we
separately consider the implications of two distinct monotonicity restrictions:
Monotonicity Assumption A: P(L =1 jW =1 )· P(L =1 jW =0 )
Monotonicity Assumption B: P(L =1 jW =1 ;Z=1 )· P(L =1 jW =0 ;Z=1 )
The …rst assumption states directly that the truly disabled are less likely to
work. The second assumption states that the employment probability among those
providing valid responses (veri…ed or not) is higher for the able-bodied than for the
disabled.14 Throughout this section, we assume that all workers are veri…ed and
allow for the possibility that respondents in other observed subgroups are veri…ed
as well.15
Monotonicity Assumption A implies the informative restriction that the prob-
ability that workers are disabled can be no greater than the probability that non-
workers are disabled:
maxfP(W =1 jL =1 ) ;P(X =1 ;Y =1 jL =0 ) g·P(W =1 jL =0 ) : (6)
Combining (4) and (6) implies a new restriction on the lower bound:
Proposition 3A: Under Monotonicity Assumption A and the veri…cation assump-
tions P(Z =1 jL =1 )=P(Z =1 jY =1 )=1 ,
maxfP(X =1 jL =1 ) ;P(X =1 ;Y =1 ) g·P(W =1 ) :
Notice that if only workers are veri…ed (e.g., Kreider, 1999), the proposition simpli-
…es to P(X =1 jY =1 )· P(W =1 ) : Since the lower bound on the disability rate
among nonworkers increases from 0 to the observed disability rate for workers, the
monotonicity assumption has identifying power. In particular, since the lower bound
14Lambert and Tierney (1997) and Dominitz and Sherman (1998) evaluate the
identifying power of this type of monotonicity assumption in the context of contam-
inated sampling.
15As in Section 5, we can relax the assumption of full veri…cation of workers to
allow for partial veri…cation (vy < 1). These more general results under partial
veri…cation are available upon request.
10under veri…cation equals P(X =1 ;Y =1 ) , the monotonicity assumption increases
this bound by the inverse of the veri…cation probability, 1=P(Y =1 ) . The smaller
the fraction of veri…ed cases, the greater the identifying power of the monotonicity
assumption.
Monotonicity Assumption B restricts the relationship between able-bodied and
disabled accurate reporters. This makes it useful to rewrite the prevalence rate for
true disability as
P(W =1 )=P(X =1 ;Y =1 )+P(X =0 ;Y =0 )+¢ (7)
where ¢=P(X =1 ;Z =1 ;Y =0 )¡ P(X =0 ;Z =1 ;Y =0 )measures the
unidenti…ed di¤erence between the numbers of disabled and able-bodied who pro-
vide accurate but unveri…ed reports. Assumption B raises the lower bound on the
disability rate by constraining the di¤erence between the two unobserved probabil-
ities in ¢. This assumption e¤ectively reveals the existence of some truly disabled
individuals (W =1 )within the unveri…ed subpopulation. In particular, we derive
the following proposition in the appendix:
Proposition 3B: Monotonicity Assumption B and the veri…cation assumptions
P(Z =1 jL =1 )=P(Z =1 jY =1 )=1imply:
P(X =1 ;Y =1 )+m a x fP(X =0 ;Y =0 )+°0 + I(°1 < 1)(°1 ¡ 1)P(X =0 ;Y =0 ) ;0g
· P(W =1 ) :
where °1 =
P(X=1;L=1)
P(X=0;L=1) and °0 = °1P(X =0 ;Y =1 )¡ P(X =1 ;Y =1 ) :
If only workers’ reports are veri…ed, the bound simpli…es to
P(X =1 ;Y =1 )+P(X =0 ;Y =0 )+I(°1 < 1)(°1 ¡ 1)P(X =0 ;Y =0 )· P(W =1 ) :
Since the lower bound under veri…cation alone equals P(X =1 ;Y =1 ) ,t h em o n o -
tonicity assumption is informative whenever P(X =0 ;Y =0 )> 0.
Table 3 displays the estimated bounds and 90% con…dence intervals under the
monotonicity assumptions. In our application, these monotonicity assumptions tend
to modestly raise the lower bound. When only workers are veri…ed, for example,
Assumption A increases the lower bound from 6% to 10%, while under assumption
B the lower bound increases to 8%. When disability bene…ciaries are veri…ed, the
monotonicity assumptions are uninformative.
7. MONOTONICITY WITHOUT VERIFICATION: MIV BOUNDS
11There may also be known monotonic relationships between the disability rate
and unveri…ed subpopulations. Arguably, for instance, the true disability rate is
nondecreasing with the age of respondents. Formally, let u measure the age of
the respondent and let LB(u) and UB(u) be the known lower and upper bounds,
respectively, given the available information on the true disability rate, P(W =1 ju):
Age is a monotone instrumental variable (MIV) if the true disability rate weakly
increases with u. Under this restriction, Manski and Pepper (2000, Proposition 1
and Corollary 1) show that
sup
u0¸u1
LB(u1) · P(W =1 ju = u0) · inf
u0·u2
UB(u2): (8)
There are no other restrictions implied by the MIV assumption. To …nd the MIV
bounds on the unconditional disability rate, one takes the appropriate weighted
average of the upper and lower bounds across the di¤erent values of the instru-
ment.16 Since the MIV assumption alone has no identifying power, we combine this
assumption with the various veri…cation and monotonicity assumptions presented
in Sections 4-6. Based on the age composition of respondents in the HRS, we divide
the sample into seven age groups: those younger than 51, …ve two-year age groups
between 51 and 60, and those older than 60.
As seen in Table 4, the assumption that age is an MIV appears to have sub-
stantial identifying power. Under the restriction that only workers are veri…ed (and
imposing no labor force monotonicity assumptions from Section 6), the disability
rate is estimated to lie within [0.071, 0.322]. The MIV assumption reduces the
range of uncertainty from 34 points to 25 points. When all the subgroups in the
table are veri…ed, the MIV assumption e¤ectively narrows the bounds to a point:
the estimated lower bound of 0.158 is almost exactly the upper bound of 0.157.17
Notice that the upper bound under the MIV assumption is often less than the
self-reported disability rate of 0.218. In some cases, the 90% con…dence interval
under the MIV assumption is strictly less than the con…dence interval for the self-
reported disability rate. Thus, as long as disability does not decline with age, these
results suggest that conventional models which presume valid self-reports may be
misspeci…ed.
16While consistency of these bound estimates is easy to establish, the …nite sample
properties are not well understood (Manski and Pepper, 2000). Finite sample bias
may be a particular concern in those cases where the bound estimate is obtained by
taking the suprema or in…ma of several kernel estimates. We do not attempt to re-
solve these statistical questions in the present paper. With over 12,000 observations
in this application, however, we are not especially concerned about small sample
biases.
17That the lower bound slightly exceeds the upper bound might be evidence that
the maintained MIV or veri…cation assumptions are invalid or, alternatively, it may
re‡ect sampling variability in the estimated parameters. Since the 90 percent boot-
strap con…dence intervals for the upper and lower bounds overlap in all cases, it
seems reasonable to proceed as if the maintained assumptions are valid. That is,
the disability rate appears to be nearly identi…ed.
128. CONCLUSION
To draw inferences about disability status and the relationship between disability
and participation decisions, researchers invariably impose strong assumptions that
restrict the nature of misreporting. The strength of the conclusions one can draw,
however, depends on the credibility and strength of the assumptions one is willing
to impose. In the absence of assumptions about the prevalence of false positive and
false negative reports of work capacity, the true disability rate could lie anywhere
between 0 and 100 percent. With stronger and often untenable restrictions, this
uncertainty can be substantially mitigated or even eliminated – but then uncertainty
arises regarding the validity of the maintained assumptions. Ultimately, replacing
one form of uncertainty with another does little to resolve the debate.
This paper has explored middle ground information settings. Although we are
unable to exactly identify disability rates except in special cases, our framework
allows us to impose credible assumptions that provide informative bounds. Layer-
ing successively stronger veri…cation and monotonicity assumptions, we narrow the
bounds in our application such that the estimated true disability rate for respon-
dents nearing retirement age lies within a six-point range. Under the assumption
that the true disability rate weakly increases with age, the bounds are narrowed
even further. In this case, the 90% con…dence intervals often do not include the self-
reported disability rate, thus casting doubt on the validity of treating self-reports
as accurate.
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15A p p e n d i x :P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 B :
Monotonicity Assumption B implies
P(X =1 ;L=1 )
P(X =1 ;Y =1 )+P(X =1 ;Y =0 ;Z=1 )
(A1)
·
P(X =0 ;L=1 )
P(X =0 ;Y =1 )+P(X =0 ;Y =0 ;Z=1 )
which in turn implies
°0 +( °1 ¡ 1)P(X =0 ;Y =0 ;Z=1 ) (A2)
· P(X =1 ;Y =0 ;Z=1 )¡ P(X =0 ;Y =0 ;Z=1 ) ;
where °1 =
P(X=1;L=1)
P(X=0;L=1) and °0 = °1P(X =0 ;Y =1 )¡ P(X =1 ;Y =1 ) : The
unknown probability P(X =0 ;Y =0 ;Z=1 )must lie within [0;P(X =0 ;Y =0 ) ] .
Thus, if °1 < 1, the lower bound is minimized if P(X =0 ;Y =0 ;Z=1 )=P(X =
0;Y =0 ) Otherwise, the lower bound is minimized if P(X =0 ;Y =0 ;Z=1 )=0 :
The result follows by combining (A2) and Proposition 1. ¤Table 1
Descriptive Statistics
A. Means and Standard Deviations
             All (N=12,652)        Men (N=5867)     Women (N=6785)
                                                             mean     st. dev.        mean    st. dev.       mean      st. dev
  Work-limited (self-reported)      .215      .411     .226  .418 .205        .404
  Disability precludes work (self-reported)    .094      .291     .109       .311        .080        .272
    ‘Yes’ to either of the above (X=1)      .218      .413     .230       .421        .208        .406
  Labor force participant (L=1)                      .66        .473      .715       .451     .617        .486
  Current receipt of disability income
† .100      .300    .111       .314     .0911      .288
  Age                                                           55.6      5.66     57.4      5.38        54.1          5.45
  Years of schooling                                   12.0     3.27     12.0      3.53        12.0          3.03
  High school graduate      .708        .455      .699 .459       .716        .451
  College graduate      .175        .380      .209 .406         .145        .353
  White collar occupation        .249        .432      .281 .450         .220        .415
  Nonwhite race      .280        .449 .261 .439     .296        .457
B. Proportion Reporting a Work Limitation
                                                 
          Sample Size        P(X=1)
All        12,652 .218        
Workers             8396  .097   
Nonworkers     4276 .456
Disability beneficiaries         1272  .783 
Nonbeneficiaries  11,400 .155
Age < 50              1228 .158
50 # Age < 62       10,109 .216
Age $ 62                  976 .293
†These numbers represent lower bounds for the proportion of respondents who would report that they receive
 disability benefits.  In some cases we observe disability income in the household but cannot determine which
 family member was eligible for the benefit.   Table 2
Estimated HM and Verification Bounds
and Bootstrapped 90% Confidence Intervals
                                       
                                            HM Bounds        Bounds Given Verification
                                                                              
      Verified Groups              v                   P(W=1)                          P(W=1) 
  
 
   beneficiaries        0.100 [0.000,  1.000] [0.079, 0.978]
        [0.000      1.000]
*  [0.075     0.980]
wave 2 verification 0.267 [0.000,  0.951] [0.037, 0.770]
                                        [0.000      0.959]     [0.034     0.776]
workers              0.662 [0.000,  0.556] [0.064, 0.402]
[0.000      0.568]   [0.061     0.410]
 
  claim no disability   0.782 [0.000,  0.437]    [0.000, 0.218]
       [0.000      0.449]     [0.000     0.225]
  all of the above       0.920 [0.156,  0.281]   [0.156, 0.218]
[0.151      0.289] [0.151     0.225]
    
          N = 12,652
      *Bootstrapped 90% confidence intervals based on 500 pseudo samples. The reported lower
    bound represents the 5
th percentile lower bound; the reported upper bound represents the
                         95
th percentile upper bound. Table 3
Estimated Bounds Under Monotonicity Assumptions
                                                                                                          Bounds       Monotonicity           Monotonicity
Verified Groups                                           v                  HM Bounds        Given Verification      Assumption A          Assumption B
  workers                                        0.662     [0.000, 0.556]     [0.064, 0.402]     [0.097, 0.402]      [0.084, 0.402]
[0.000      0.568]
* [0.061      0.410]      [0.092      0.410]        [0.080      0.410]
  workers + beneficiaries             0.745     [0.000, 0.474]     [0.139, 0.394]      [0.139, 0.394]      [0.139, 0.394]
[0.000      0.484]    [0.134      0.402]         [0.134      0.402]        [0.134      0.402]
  workers + wave 2 verification 0.816   [0.035, 0.402]     [0.092, 0.275]      [0.097, 0.275]      [0.092, 0.275]
                                         [0.028      0.413]      [0.088      0.282]        [0.092      0.282]        [0.088      0.282]
  workers + claim no disability             0.846     [0.064, 0.372]     [0.064, 0.218]      [0.097, 0.218]      [0.084, 0.218]
[0.061      0.383]     [0.061      0.225]           [0.092      0.225]        [0.080      0.225]
  all of the above                            0.920     [0.156, 0.281]     [0.156, 0.218]      [0.156, 0.218]      [0.156, 0.218]
[0.151      0.289]     [0.151      0.225]        [0.151      0.225]         [0.151      0.225]
Table 4
Estimated Bounds Under the Assumption that Age is a Monotone Instrumental Variable
                                                          Bounds                Monotonicity           Monotonicity
Verified Groups                                           v                  HM Bounds        Given Verification      Assumption A          Assumption B
  workers                        0.662 [0.000, 0.417]     [0.071, 0.322]     [0.101, 0.322]     [0.089, 0.322]
                                       [0.000      0.435]
*    [0.068      0.328]    [0.098      0.328]     [0.086      0.328]
  workers + beneficiaries         0.745 [0.006, 0.375]     [0.144, 0.316]     [0.144, 0.316]     [0.144, 0.316]
                                     [0.000      0.383]     [0.138      0.323]     [0.138      0.323]     [0.138      0.323]
  workers + wave 2 verification    0.816 [0.041, 0.295]     [0.094, 0.225]     [0.101, 0.225]     [0.094, 0.225]
                               [0.036      0.318]     [0.091      0.236]     [0.098      0.236]     [0.092      0.236]
  workers + claim no disability   0.846 [0.071, 0.246]     [0.071, 0.157]     [0.101, 0.157]     [0.089, 0.157]
                               [0.069      0.273]     [0.068      0.172]     [0.098      0.172]     [0.086      0.172]
  all of the above                 0.920 [0.158, 0.198]     [0.158, 0.157]     [0.158, 0.157]     [0.158, 0.157]
                                                  [0.154      0.217]     [0.154      0.172]     [0.154      0.172]     [0.154      0.172]
 *Bootstrapped 90 percent confidence intervals